Week 2: Corporate Governance and Discounted Cash Flow Valuation (Ch. 2, 5)
Week 2 covers two chapters. Chapter 2 (corporate governance) asks whether managers and large shareholders actually pursue the goal of maximising shareholder value, and which mechanisms and institutions help. Chapter 5 (discounted cash flow valuation) extends the time value of money from single payments to multiple cash flows: perpetuities, annuities (ordinary, due, delayed and growing), compounding more than once a year (EAR, APR) and the most common loan types.
Corporate governance
Corporate governance is concerned with how firms manage themselves and how that performance is monitored. When shareholders hire professional managers, it must be ensured that decisions maximise shareholder wealth and not the personal wealth of managers. Corporate governance sits between four groups: managers, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. The lecture uses the takeover of Twitter by Elon Musk (shareholders approved his $44 billion bid in September 2022 while Musk tried to back out of the deal) as a business example.
(Book, 2.1) The three legal forms of business are the sole proprietorship (one owner, unlimited liability, income taxed as personal income, life limited to the owner, capital limited to the owner's wealth), the partnership (general partners with unlimited liability; in a limited partnership limited partners are liable only for what they contributed) and the corporation, a legal person separate from its owners. The corporation offers limited liability, easy transfer of ownership and unlimited life, which makes it superior for raising cash; its main disadvantage is double taxation (profits taxed at the corporate level and dividends again at the shareholder level). In the Netherlands the NV is the publicly listed form and the BV the private limited form.
Agency theory: two types of relationship
An agency relationship exists whenever a principal hires an agent to represent his or her interests. There is always a possible conflict of interest between the two (for example, an agent who sells your car for a flat fee wants a quick sale, not the best price; a commission aligns interests better).
| Type I | Type II | |
|---|---|---|
| Relationship | Managers versus shareholders | Majority (controlling) shareholders versus minority shareholders |
| Typical setting | Widely held firms (UK, US) | Closely held firms with a dominant family, bank or government (much of continental Europe) |
| Conflict | Managers want to maximise their own wealth and power; shareholders want to maximise firm value | Majority shareholders want to use their control for their own benefit; minority shareholders want to maximise the value per ordinary share; bondholders want to maximise bond value |
Type I: conflicting goals and agency costs
Left alone, managers may maximise the resources under their control (overemphasis on size and growth, overpaying for acquisitions), overemphasise organisational survival to protect their jobs, and dislike outside interference. The costs of this conflict are agency costs:
| Direct agency costs | Indirect agency costs |
|---|---|
| (1) Corporate expenditures that benefit managers at the expense of shareholders, such as a private jet or large administrative tiers. (2) Expenditures to monitor and control managers, such as paying outside auditors. | Lost opportunities because managers are more risk averse than shareholders. Example: shareholders want to invest in risky new product development that raises share value, but managers fear a higher chance of bankruptcy and losing their job, so they invest too little. |
CEO pay. The CEO-to-worker compensation ratio in large US companies rose from about 20 in 1965 to over 350 around 2000 and was about 271 in 2016. Executive pay in the US and UK consists largely of long-term incentives (shares and options); in continental Europe (for example Italy) base salary is a larger part.
Aligning managers' interests with shareholders' interests. Whether managers act for shareholders depends on how well their goals are aligned (compensation) and whether they can be replaced (control). Four mechanisms:
- Managerial compensation: performance-based pay such as shares and options, so managers gain when the share price rises. Better performers also get promoted and are in higher demand on the labour market.
- Control of the firm: the power of shareholders to control the firm through the board structure and voting rights. Shareholders elect the board, which hires and fires managers (Steve Jobs was once removed from Apple by the board).
- Shareholder rights: the facility for shareholders to call managers to account, laid down for example in the bylaws. Other rights: to share proportionally in dividends and in liquidation proceeds, to vote on major matters such as mergers, and sometimes a pre-emptive right to buy new shares first.
- Proxy voting: a proxy is a grant of authority by a shareholder allowing another person to vote his or her shares. Management tries to collect as many proxies as possible; dissatisfied shareholders can start a proxy fight to replace management.
(Book) Some firms have classes of shares with unequal voting rights: Alphabet's founders own Class B shares with 10 votes each, giving them 57% of the votes with 5.7% of the shares. Dividends are paid at the discretion of the board, are not a liability until declared, are not tax deductible and are taxed at the shareholder level; paying out cash can discipline managers who might otherwise waste it.
Unitary versus dual board structures
| One-tier (unitary) board | Two-tier (dual) board |
|---|---|
| UK, Ireland, Sweden, US. Shareholders elect a single board containing the chairman/CEO, executive directors and non-executive directors. The board selects the managers. | Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark. A supervisory board (representatives of major shareholders, creditors and employees) monitors and appoints the executive board (chairman/CEO with directors), which runs day-to-day operations. |
Type II: conflicting goals and agency costs
When an investor owns a large stake, he or she can install or remove the board and thus steer the firm towards personal objectives, which may differ from those of minority shareholders. Examples of type II agency costs:
- A majority shareholder makes one of her firms trade on attractive terms with another of her firms: a related party transaction.
- A majority shareholder forces the company to declare a large (extraordinary) dividend because she needs the cash, for example for an investment in another company.
Stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers, government) also have claims on the firm's cash flows and may try to exert control.
Board voting systems: cumulative versus straight voting
| Cumulative voting | Straight voting |
|---|---|
| A shareholder may cast all votes for one member of the board. Total votes = shares x number of directors to be elected. Directors are elected all at once; the top N vote-getters win. Permits minority participation. | A shareholder may cast all votes for each member of the board. Directors are elected one at a time. The majority wins every seat; minorities can be frozen out. |
Cumulative voting: 1/(N + 1) of the shares plus one share, where N is the number of directors up for election.
Straight voting: 50% of the shares plus one share (which then wins every seat: all or nothing).
Example (Sole SpA): 10,000 shares outstanding, cumulative voting, 3 directors up for election. You need 10,000/(3 + 1) + 1 = 2,501 shares. With 2,500 shares against 7,500 a tie is possible (the majority can give 2,500 votes to each of three candidates); with 2,501 the remaining 7,499 votes can never give all three rivals more than 2,501 votes. At a share price of €20 the seat costs 2,501 x €20 = €50,020.
Tutorial: 20,000 shares at €25 and 4 directors up for election: 20,000/5 + 1 = 4,001 shares, costing 4,001 x 25 = €100,025. Book example: Smith has 20 shares, Jones 80, four seats: Smith casts 80 votes on himself and Jones cannot give four candidates more than 80 each, so Smith wins a seat; under straight voting Jones takes all seats.
Staggered elections (only part of the board is elected at a time) reduce the effect of cumulative voting: with 2 seats up it takes 1/3 of the shares plus one. Staggering also makes takeovers harder, but provides continuity ('institutional memory').
International corporate governance
| Common law | Civil law |
|---|---|
| Law develops through court rulings. Flexible and adjusts quickly to events (loopholes can be closed quickly). UK, Ireland, US. Better investor protection, so equity markets are more popular. | Law develops through regulation and codes of law; judges interpret but cannot change it. Based on a code of principles that changes slowly. Most of continental Europe. |
A third type is religious law (for example sharia, which forbids interest). Besides the legal system, enforcement and corruption matter (Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index).
| Bank-based system | Market-based system |
|---|---|
| Banks are central in moving funds between suppliers and demanders of capital. More active monitoring by banks, which are often involved in long-term strategy. Ownership more clustered (concentrated). Managers may have longer horizons. | Securities markets are as important as banks, often much more important. External market discipline. Ownership rather fragmented. Possibly more short-term focus on share price, but argued to be more efficient at funding. |
A common measure is domestic bank deposits divided by stock market capitalisation: a high ratio means bank-based. Examples: US 0.91 and UK 1.03 (market-based), Netherlands 1.63, Germany 5.01 and Austria 10.24 (bank-based). Ownership structure differs too: 100% of the 20 largest UK firms are widely held, whereas family or state ownership dominates in countries such as Greece, Belgium or Austria. Widely held firms face mostly type I problems; closely held firms mostly type II problems. Family firms tend to take a longer-term view; state-owned firms also pursue political objectives.
Underlying assumption for the rest of the course: corporate executives act in the interest of the shareholders. There is no self-dealing or investment in projects that maximise managers' own wealth, and no financing decisions that minimise the risk for the firm (or managers) but not for shareholders. Transparency and timely disclosure are essential; most countries have a corporate governance code (the Netherlands: the Dutch Corporate Governance Code).
Multiple cash flows
Week 1 dealt with a single payment (what is a payment now worth later, or a future payment worth today). Now we look at multiple cash flows, especially cash flows that occur periodically and are always of the same amount. The present value of several cash flows is the sum of their individual present values; the future value is the sum of their individual future values.
PV example: €1,000 at the end of each of the next five years at 6%: 1,000/1.06 + 1,000/1.06^2 + ... + 1,000/1.06^5 = 943.40 + 890.00 + 839.62 + 792.09 + 747.26 = €4,212.37.
FV example: €2,000 invested at the end of each of the next five years at 10%: 2,000 x 1.1^4 + 2,000 x 1.1^3 + 2,000 x 1.1^2 + 2,000 x 1.1 + 2,000 = 2,928.20 + 2,662.00 + 2,420.00 + 2,200.00 + 2,000.00 = €12,210.20. The last payment earns no interest because it is made at the end of year 5.
PV = C1/(1 + r) + C2/(1 + r)^2 + ... + CT/(1 + r)^T
Ct = cash flow at the end of period t; r = discount rate per period; T = last period.
Perpetuities
A level stream of cash flows that continues forever.
V0 = C/(1 + r) + C/(1 + r)^2 + C/(1 + r)^3 + ... The slides derive the formula in two ways. (1) Divide the series by (1 + r) and subtract it from the original: V0 - V0/(1 + r) = C/(1 + r), because the term C/(1 + r)^(infinity) goes to zero. Then V0 x r/(1 + r) = C/(1 + r), so V0 = C/r. (2) With the geometric series 1 + q + q^2 + ... = 1/(1 - q) for |q| < 1 and q = 1/(1 + r): V0 = C/(1 + r) x 1/(1 - 1/(1 + r)) = C/(1 + r) x (1 + r)/r = C/r.
PV0 = C / r
C = constant cash flow per period, first payment one period from now; r = discount rate per period.
Example: £1,000 every year forever at 6%: PV = 1,000/0.06 = £16,666.67.
PV0 = (C/r) / (1 + r)^T
If the first payment occurs at date T + 1, the perpetuity formula gives its value at date T (one period before the first payment); discount that value back T periods.
Example: a perpetuity starting in year 6 is worth C/r at year 5, so PV0 = (C/r)/(1 + r)^5.
PV0 = C / (r - g) (only if r > g)
C = the first cash flow, received one period from now; g = constant growth rate per period. Derived with the geometric series with q = (1 + g)/(1 + r), which only converges if g < r.
If C is the cash flow just paid (C0), the first payment is C0 x (1 + g): PV0 = C0 x (1 + g)/(r - g).
Example (apartment building): cash flows to the landlord of €100,000 next year, growing 5% per year forever, discount rate 11%: PV = 100,000/(0.11 - 0.05) = €1,666,667. Tutorial: an oil source produces €100m next year, growing 2% forever, at 10%: PV = 100/(0.10 - 0.02) = €1,250m.
Annuities
A level stream of cash flows for a fixed period of time (T periods). An ordinary annuity pays at the end of each period.
Derivation with the finite geometric series 1 + q + ... + q^(n - 1) = (1 - q^n)/(1 - q), or intuitively: annuity = perpetuity minus delayed perpetuity. A perpetuity starting now is worth C/r; a perpetuity whose payments start after date T is worth (C/r)/(1 + r)^T; their difference is exactly the payments from 1 to T.
PV = C x [1/r - 1/(r(1 + r)^T)] = C x [1 - 1/(1 + r)^T]/r = C x A(r, T)
C = level cash flow per period; r = rate per period; T = number of payments. The term [1 - 1/(1 + r)^T]/r = (1 - PVF)/r is the annuity present value factor A(r, T), tabulated in Appendix A of the book (for example 3.7908 for 10% and 5 periods).
Example: 1,000 per year for 5 years at 6%: PV = 1,000 x 4.2124 = 4,212.37. Example: €800 per year for 8 years at 8%: PV = 800 x 5.7466 = €4,597.31.
Solving for the payment: C = PV / A(r, T). Mortgage example (slides): a Dutch bank's calculator says that with a gross income of €100,000 you can borrow €320,367 with an annuity mortgage at 3.61% fixed for 30 years (360 months). Monthly payment: C = 320,367 / [1/(0.0361/12) - 1/((0.0361/12)(1 + 0.0361/12)^360)] = €1,458.33. In an annuity mortgage (annuïteitenhypotheek) the total monthly payment is constant: at the start mostly interest, at the end mostly repayment. In a linear mortgage (lineaire hypotheek) the repayment is constant, so the total payment starts high and falls as the interest decreases.
Finding the number of payments: you borrow €1,000 on a credit card at 1.5% per month and pay €20 per month. 1,000 = 20 x [1/0.015 - 1/(0.015 x 1.015^T)] gives 1.015^T = 4, so T = ln 4/ln 1.015 = 93.11 months (almost 8 years).
Annuity due
An annuity whose cash flows occur at the beginning of each period. PV(annuity due) = PV(ordinary annuity) x (1 + r), or: the first payment at t = 0 plus an ordinary annuity of T - 1 payments.
Example: you win £50,000 per year for 20 years, paid at the start of each year starting immediately; discount rate 8%. Value = 50,000 + 50,000 x [1/0.08 - 1/(0.08 x 1.08^19)] = 50,000 + 480,180 = £530,180: the payment at t = 0 plus a 19-year ordinary annuity.
Delayed annuity
If the first payment is not at t = 1, value the annuity at one period before its first payment and then discount that single amount back to t = 0.
Example (Danielle Caravello): a 4-year annuity of €500 per year with the first payment at date 6, at 10%. Step 1: value in year 5: V5 = 500 x [1/0.1 - 1/(0.1 x 1.1^4)] = €1,584.93. Step 2: discount to year 0: V0 = 1,584.93/1.1^5 = €984.12.
Exercise: a 5-year annuity of €600 with the first payment in year 5, at 5%. Value in year 4 = 600 x A(5%, 5) = 2,597.69; PV0 = 2,597.69/1.05^4 = €2,137. Common mistake: discounting 5 years instead of 4.
Growing annuity
PV0 = C x [1 - ((1 + g)/(1 + r))^T] / (r - g) (only if r > g)
C = first payment (at t = 1); g = growth rate of payments; T = number of payments. Derived with the finite geometric series with q = (1 + g)/(1 + r).
Example (lottery): 20 payments, first 200,000, then growing 5% per year, discount rate 11%: PV = 200,000 x [1 - (1.05/1.11)^20]/(0.11 - 0.05) = 2,236,337. Tutorial: a project paying €10,000 in year 1, growing 4% per year for 8 years, at 8%: PV = 10,000 x [1 - (1.04/1.08)^8]/0.04 = €65,151.18, the maximum you should pay.
Future value of an annuity
FV = C x [(1 + r)^T - 1] / r
The term [(1 + r)^T - 1]/r = (FVF - 1)/r is the annuity future value factor.
Example: €2,000 at the end of each of five years at 10%: FV = 2,000 x (1.1^5 - 1)/0.1 = 2,000 x 6.1051 = €12,210.20.
Tutorial examples: £400 per month at 7% compounded monthly for 40 years (480 deposits): FV = 400 x [(1 + 0.07/12)^480 - 1]/(0.07/12) = £1,049,925. €500 per month at 9% compounded monthly, but with the first deposit two months from now and the horizon 30 years: there are 359 deposits, FV = 500 x [(1.0075)^359 - 1]/0.0075 = €908,061 (with 360 deposits it would be €915,372).
Compounding more than once per year: EAR
Interest can be paid semi-annually (2 times a year), quarterly (4), monthly (12), weekly (52), daily (365) or continuously.
- Quoted (stated, nominal) interest rate: the rate expressed in terms of the interest payment made each period, quoted per year without compounding.
- Effective annual rate (EAR): the rate expressed as if it were compounded once per year.
EAR = (1 + q/m)^m - 1
q = quoted annual interest rate; m = number of compounding periods per year; q/m = rate per period.
Example: 30% compounded annually gives EAR = 30%; compounded semi-annually (1 + 0.3/2)^2 - 1 = 32.25%. More compounding periods give a higher EAR: EAR(q, m) > EAR(q, 1).
Example: 8% compounded quarterly: EAR = (1 + 0.08/4)^4 - 1 = 8.2432%, larger than the quoted 8%.
Tutorial: a car loan at 0.75% per month has EAR = 1.0075^12 - 1 = 9.38%. If the EAR is 13%, the effective weekly rate is 1.13^(1/52) - 1 = 0.2353%. A quoted 4% gives an EAR of 4.00% (annual), 4.04% (semi-annual) and 4.08% (weekly). APR and EAR are identical when the interest rate is 0% or compounding is annual.
Multi-year compounding: Harry DeAngelo invests €5,000 at a quoted 12% compounded quarterly for five years. Either use the EAR, 5,000 x (1 + EAR)^5, or directly the quarterly rate: 5,000 x (1 + 0.12/4)^(4 x 5) = 5,000 x 1.03^20 = €9,031. Tutorial: £58,000 in seven years at 10% compounded daily: PV = 58,000/(1 + 0.10/365)^(365 x 7) = £28,804.71. €5,100 for 20 years at 10% compounded semi-annually: FV = 5,100 x 1.05^40 = €35,903.94.
EAR = e^q - 1
e = Euler's number, 2.71828...
At a quoted 10%: annual 10.00000%, quarterly 10.38129%, monthly 10.47131%, weekly 10.50648%, daily 10.51558%, hourly 10.51703%, per minute 10.51709%, continuous e^0.1 - 1 = 10.51709%. The EAR increases with compounding frequency but converges to a limit.
The annual percentage rate (APR)
Many loans have front-end or back-end fees (management, administration). In the EU, since 2010 all consumer loans below €75,000 (in the Netherlands also mortgages) must state the effective interest rate including all costs, not just the interest payments. This is the Annual Percentage Rate (APR). Often APR = EAR, if there are no extra fees or costs not already included in the EAR. Beware: in the US the APR means the stated (simple) interest rate, which is lower than the EAR.
Example (homework, car loan): price £30,000, 'simple annual interest of 12% on the original amount over three years, payable in 36 monthly instalments', plus an administration fee of £250. The lender charges 12% on £30,000 every year: £3,600 per year, £10,800 in total. Monthly payment = 30,000/36 + 30,000 x 0.12/12 = 833.33 + 300.00 = £1,133.33. The effective APR is the rate that makes the PV of 36 payments of £1,133.33 equal to the net amount received (30,000 - 250 = 29,750): about 1.818% per month, so APR = 1.01818^12 - 1 = 24.13% (found numerically, for example with Excel). By law the lender must also state the total amount payable (£250 + 36 x £1,133.33 = £41,050) and the total charge for credit (£41,050 - £30,000 = £11,050). The quoted 12% hides the fact that interest is charged on the full original amount although the debt is repaid gradually.
Loan types and amortisation
| Loan type | Payments |
|---|---|
| Pure discount loan | Principal and interest paid together at the end (like a zero coupon bond or T-bill). |
| Interest-only loan | Only interest in between; the full principal at the end. |
| Amortised loan | Regular repayment: the same amount each period (annuity) covering interest and principal. |
| Partially amortised loan | Regular equal payments plus a large final 'balloon' (bullet) payment. |
Pure discount loan (T-bill): a T-bill promises £10,000 in 12 months; the market rate is 7%. Price = 10,000/1.07 = £9,346. The loan amount is £9,346 and the 'interest' is £654.
Amortised loan (mortgage): a €100,000 commercial mortgage at 1% effective per month with 20-year (240-month) amortisation is an ordinary annuity: 100,000 = C x [1/0.01 - 1/(0.01 x 1.01^240)], so C = €1,101.09 per month.
Partially amortised loan (balloon): the same mortgage with a five-year (60-month) balloon. After 60 payments the remaining loan is a 180-month annuity; the balloon equals the PV of those remaining payments: 1,101.09 x [1/0.01 - 1/(0.01 x 1.01^180)] = €91,744 at t = 60.
Tutorial (mortgages): a 32-year mortgage with quarterly payments of €4,000 at 2.14% per year compounded quarterly: loan = 4,000 x [1 - 1/(1 + 0.0214/4)^128]/(0.0214/4) = €370,009.50; with an extra deposit of 20% of the loan the purchase price is 1.2 x 370,009.50 = €444,011. A 25-year mortgage with monthly payments of €717 at 6.14% compounded monthly: loan = €109,820; purchase price = 1.2 x 109,820 = €131,784.
Tutorial (comparing annuities): investment X pays €6,500 per year for 9 years, Y €8,000 per year for 6 years, at 15%: PV(X) = €31,015 and PV(Y) = €30,276, so X is worth more. If X pays £5,000 per year for 9 years at a stated 5% (PV = £35,539.11) and Y pays semi-annually for 6 years at 2.5% per half year, the equal-value semi-annual payment is 35,539.11/A(2.5%, 12) = £3,464.61.
Tutorial (retirement): you deposit £500 a month in a share account (EAR 7%) and £500 a month in a bond account (EAR 4%) for 30 years. Monthly rates: 1.07^(1/12) - 1 = 0.5654% and 1.04^(1/12) - 1 = 0.3274%. FV = £584,726 + £342,635 = £927,361. You then withdraw monthly for 25 years from an account earning 6% EAR (0.4868% per month): C = 927,361/A(0.4868%, 300) = about £5,885 per month. Note that an EAR must be converted to an effective monthly rate with the root, not divided by 12.
Overview of DCF formulas
| Cash flow pattern | Present value |
|---|---|
| Single payment | Ct/(1 + r)^t |
| Different cash flows | sum of Ci/(1 + r)^i |
| Level perpetuity | C/r |
| Growing perpetuity | C/(r - g) |
| Level annuity | C/r - C/(r(1 + r)^T) |
| Growing annuity | C/(r - g) x [1 - ((1 + g)/(1 + r))^T] |
| Annuity due | ordinary annuity x (1 + r) |
| Delayed annuity or perpetuity | value one period before the first payment, discounted back |
Andere hoofdstukken van Corporate Finance
- Week 1: Corporate Finance, Financial Statements and Time Value of Money (Ch. 1, 3, 4)
- Week 3: Bond and Equity Valuation (Ch. 6, 7)
- Week 4: Investment Criteria, Capital Investment Decisions and Project Analysis (Ch. 8, 9, 10.3 to 10.5)
- Week 5: Cost of Capital and Raising Capital (Ch. 13, 14)
- Week 6: Risk, Return and the Security Market Line; Lessons from Capital Market History (Ch. 12, 11)
- Week 7: Financial Risk Management and Lessons on Investing (Ch. 20)